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An Antitrust Analysis of the Case for Wireless Network Neutrality 






The ongoing debate about possible implementation of regulatory rules requiring “network 
neutrality” for wireless telecommunications services is inherently about whether to impose a 
prohibition on the ability of network operators to control their vertical relationships.  Antitrust 
analysis is well suited to analyze whether a wireless network neutrality rule is socially beneficial.  
Implementing network neutrality rules would be akin to using a per se antitrust rule regarding 
vertical relationships instead of the rule of reason analysis typically applied to vertical 
relationships in antitrust.  Per se rules are used to prevent actions that rarely, if ever, have any 
pro-competitive benefits, such as price-fixing agreements.  Rule of reason analysis is used when 
there are potential efficiency gains from the actions under investigation.   
 
Some vertical practices of the wireless carriers, such as bandwidth restrictions, may 
appear to be anticompetitive, but may also have plausible efficiency justifications so should be 
judged under rule of reason analysis.  Economic examination of the wireless industry shows 
significant competition between networks which reduces the concern about vertical relationships, 
but some areas that should be monitored by antitrust and regulatory authorities.  We propose 
several regulatory changes that would likely increase wireless competition and lessen the 
perceived need for prophylactic network neutrality rules while at the same time allowing 
efficiency-enhancing vertical relationships. 
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I.  Introduction 
Antitrust and regulation are closely linked because ideally both are invoked to correct 
market failures and to enhance social welfare.  Currently there is a debate about possible 
implementation of a regulatory rule requiring “network neutrality” for wireless 
telecommunications services.  Inherently, the network neutrality debate is about whether to 
impose a prohibition on the ability of network operators to control their vertical relationships.
1  
Implementing network neutrality rules would be akin to using a per se antitrust rule regarding 
vertical relationships instead of the rule of reason analysis typically applied to vertical 
relationships in antitrust.  Per se rules are used to prevent actions that rarely, if ever, have any 
pro-competitive benefits, such as price-fixing agreements.  Rule of reason analysis is used when 
there are potential efficiency gains from the actions under investigation. 
In this article, we argue that antitrust analysis is well suited to analyze whether a wireless 
network neutrality rule is socially beneficial.  Then we apply such an analysis to the wireless 
industry to examine the costs and benefits from a network neutrality rule.  Finally, we propose 
several alternative mechanisms for the regulator to pursue prior to instituting prophylactic 
network neutrality regulations.  Our suggested mechanisms are all designed to increase 
competition at the network level because a lack of market power at the network operator level 
should reduce the risk of harm from vertical restrictions.  Procompetitive actions to reduce 
market power are more likely to result in the goal of increased social welfare than restrictions 
that might prevent efficiency-enhancing vertical relationships. 
In its 1968 Carterfone decision the Federal Communications Commission (“FCC” or 
“Commission”) required the Bell System to allow customers to attach telephone devices from 
independent, unaffiliated manufacturers to the Bell System network.
2  Some recent academic 
articles, regulatory efforts and public press have suggested that wireless network providers also 
be subject to Carterfone-type regulation.
3  Similar to network neutrality proposals for wireline 
high-speed Internet access,
4 “wireless Carterfone” or “wireless network neutrality” policies 
would subject wireless providers to regulation regarding restrictions the wireless providers could 
 
1 See Shelanski (2007) and Nuechterlein (2009).   
2 Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Telephone Service, 13 FCC 2d 420 (1968).  The Carterfone decision 
built on the earlier Hush-A-Phone decision (Hush-a-Phone v. United States, 238 F. 2d 266, 1956). 
3 Wu (2007), Skype (2007), Scott (2007), Mossberg (2007), Frieden (2008). 
4 See Lessig (2002) and Lessig (2004) for discussions of wireline network neutrality.       2
                                                
impose on equipment suppliers, application providers, and end-consumers.  Advocates of 
wireless Carterfone regulation claim that preventing discrimination by wireless network 
providers will give entrepreneurial firms greater ability to access wireless networks and ensure a 
market for their products without fear of expropriation by the network providers. 
For example, Wu (2007) called for applying Carterfone rules to wireless networks and 
subjecting wireless providers to the “core network neutrality principles under which the cable 
and DSL industries currently operate.”  Relying on the Wu article, Skype (2007) proposed that 
the FCC “enforce Carterfone” in the wireless industry by prohibiting certain contractual 
arrangements and requiring open access to devices, content and applications.  The FCC (2007) 
required “open access” on the Upper 700 MHz C Block in the 700 MHz spectrum auction that 
closed in March, 2008.
5  These proposals for wireless network neutrality, openness and non-
discrimination are in part motivated by various practices used by wireless providers, including 
disabling phone features, limiting data bandwidth, device certification requirements, and 
application developer restrictions. 
Critics of wireless Carterfone regulation claim that (1) these network provider practices 
benefit wireless consumers, (2) the competitiveness of the current wireless market in the U.S. 
does not justify Carterfone regulation, (3) network neutrality requirements placed on wireless 
providers are likely to stymie beneficial and efficient vertical integration and endanger legitimate 
and important network management practices, and (4) wireless Carterfone regulation would 
make it harder for firms to coordinate to innovate, reduce incentives for innovation, and in the 
process raise service provision costs and harm consumers.
6
Policy makers should be concerned not only with whether wireless network providers 
restrict third-party firms from providing equipment and applications that they would like to offer 
in conjunction with a wireless network, but also, importantly, with whether such restrictions 
harm consumers.  Unfortunately, many analyses of the situation have focused simply on whether 
 
5 Licenses must “allow customers, device manufacturers, third-party application developers, and others to use or 
develop the devices and applications of their choosing in C Block networks, so long as they meet all applicable 
regulatory requirements and comply with reasonable conditions related to management of the wireless network (i.e., 
do not cause harm to the network.)” and licensees “may not block, degrade, or interfere with the ability of end users 
to download and utilize applications of their choosing on the licensee’s C Block network, subject to reasonable 
network management.” 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd  at 15360.  
6 See, for example, CTIA (2007), Hahn, Litan and Singer (2007), Hazlett (2007), Mayo (2008), Schwartz and Mini 
(2007), and Wallsten (2007).  See Woroch (2004) and Owen and Rosston (2006) for a discussion of investment 
incentives.       3
there are restrictions and only tangentially on whether those restrictions harm consumers.  
Additionally, policy makers should consider whether wireless network neutrality regulation 
imposes its own inefficiencies; these regulatory costs need to be evaluated against potential 
benefits.     
Our economic framework discusses the circumstances under which network operators 
have the incentives and ability to inefficiently restrict third-party providers of equipment and 
applications from providing services.  Then we examine the current wireless marketplace to see 
how it fits in this framework.   
Wireless is not a textbook perfectly competitive market – deploying a network involves 
substantial fixed costs.  Thus, average prices must be greater than marginal cost to cover the 
fixed costs.  Where that markup is achieved and how that would change with the imposition of 
new wireless network neutrality regulations is an important part of the overall analysis.   
In response to the competitive concerns and issues with possible unintended 
inefficiencies due to regulation, we propose an antitrust approach that recognizes the potential 
efficiencies of current carrier practices, and suggest that the FCC introduce new regulation only 
after a careful evaluation of the wireless market shows that particular carrier practices are on 
balance anticompetitive and that consumers are better served by prophylactic regulation.  In 
general, FCC policies that foster competition among wireless providers, such as making more 
wireless spectrum available to spectrum-constrained firms and giving firms considerable 
freedom in deploying their spectrum, reduce incentives for anticompetitive foreclosure and thus 
the need for Carterfone-style regulatory intervention.   
The article proceeds as follows:  Section II provides a review of the economic theory of 
vertical restraints to provide a basis for evaluating wireless network neutrality proposals.  In that 
context, we review the original Carterfone economic rationale for regulating interconnection of 
customer premises equipment to the Bell System network.  Section III examines the 
competitiveness of the current wireless sector in the U.S.; Section IV assesses the case for 
Carterfone style regulation of wireless providers; Section V discusses the recent FCC C block 
openness decision and the implications of that decision; and Section VI discusses policy options 
for the FCC in addressing the concerns raised by advocates and critics of wireless network 
neutrality.       4
                                                
II. Vertical Restraints 
The policies challenged by Skype and other wireless network neutrality proponents can 
be viewed as “vertical restraints” placed by wireless network providers on independent upstream 
suppliers.
7  Vertical relationships between network operators and upstream suppliers—
equipment manufacturers and applications providers—are already an important part of the 
wireless industry and they are likely to increase as wireless consumers buy and use more 
wireless data devices and services.
8  It is likely that no wireless provider will ever provide all the 
equipment, content and applications that its consumers want, so if these customer wants are to be 
satisfied, wireless providers and independent upstream providers will have to interact in some 
fashion to provide equipment and services.  The relationship between upstream suppliers and 
wireless network providers raises the potential competitive concern that a network provider with 
market power might favor its own equipment, applications, or content (or those of an affiliate) 
over that of an unrelated competitor, leading to an important public policy question – when 
should a wireless network provider be regulated regarding the terms and conditions of access to 
its network?  
At the heart of the policy debate over wireless Carterfone regulation is an economics 
question – do wireless providers have the incentive and ability to profitably favor their own 
affiliates and discriminate against competing upstream providers, harming competition and 
ultimately consumers?
9  This economics question highlights the questions and concerns that 
policy makers should have in thinking about applying Carterfone style regulations to the wireless 
world.  Moreover, regulation is not costless; blanket rules can stifle efficient vertical 
arrangements, and reduce the incentives both for incumbents and new entrants to develop 
innovative new wireless service packages.  Thus, there is another hurdle to consider in wireless 
network neutrality regulation – is regulation better suited to determine the appropriate degree of 
vertical integration than competitive rivalry among wireless providers?  And these questions are 
 
7 For the purposes of this article, we treat wireless network providers as “downstream” firms and application, 
equipment and content providers as “upstream” firms. 
8 One can also think of equipment manufacturers (eg. Apple) as upstream of network providers (eg. AT&T), and  
applications developers as upstream of both Apple and AT&T. 
9 For purposes of this paper, we consider discrimination to be artificially treating content or applications of 
unaffiliated providers in a way that increases the cost or decreases the attractiveness of the product.       5
                                                
not limited to wireless.  The FCC is wrestling with similar issues in its decisions about 
acceptable practices by operators of wired broadband networks.   
A.  Carterfone and the Part 68 Rules 
At the time of the Carterfone decision, Western Electric, a Bell System entity, was the 
exclusive manufacturer of telephones and customer premises equipment for the Bell System 
telephone network.
10  The Commission’s decision allowed customers to purchase telephones and 
other equipment, such as answering machines from independent, unaffiliated manufacturers and 
to connect these to the Bell System network.  The equipment provided by unaffiliated 
manufacturers needed to meet detailed technical standards, but any equipment that met those 
standards could be attached to the Bell System network via a standardized interface without 
restriction or additional charges.
11  These FCC regulations on network attachments are known as 
Part 68 rules.
12   
B.  Economic Rationale for the Carterfone Decision 
It is well understood in the economics literature that the tactics of a regulated firm with 
market power can differ from those of an unregulated firm with market power, even though both 
have the same overall goal of maximizing profits.  A firm facing binding price regulation of its 
core monopoly product has incentives to circumvent price regulation by discriminating against 
unaffiliated firms in adjacent markets and charging supra-competitive prices on its own products.     
These discrimination incentives arise if regulation prevents the regulated firm from fully 
exploiting its market power in the core regulated market.  One way to do this, as discussed by 
Brennan (1987), is for the regulated firm to engage in “cost-shifting” and increase its overall 
profits by producing both regulated and unregulated products.  The firm, because of information 
asymmetries, can shift some of the costs from its unregulated products into the regulated “rate 
base” and increase the overall allowed profits of the firm even while profit regulation remains 
“binding.”  Noll and Owen (1994) discuss other theories about the differences between regulated 
 
10 “No equipment, apparatus, circuit or device not furnished by the telephone company shall be attached to or 
connected with the facilities furnished by the telephone company, physically, by induction or otherwise.” AT&T 
Tariff 132 (as cited in Oxman (1999)) 
11 Development of the Carterfone principle is described in more detail in Robinson (1988). 
12 Part 68 of the FCC Rules, (47 C.F.R. Part 68).       6
                                                
and unregulated firms in the context of regulation of the integrated Bell System and the U.S. v. 
AT&T case.  Others ways for the regulated firm to increase profits include mis-estimation of 
common costs (Burton, Kaserman and Mayo, 2009) and sabotage (Beard, Kaserman and Mayo, 
2001). 
Carterfone was applied to the vertically integrated Bell System at a time when it faced 
price regulation of its core monopoly telephone service, when equipment used in the Bell System 
was provided by its Western Electric affiliate, and when independent equipment manufacturers 
had very limited alternative outlets for selling telephones and other customer premises 
equipment.  Thus, Carterfone was applied at a time when the Bell System had both the incentive 
and the ability to restrict consumer use of third-party equipment as a way to shift sales in 
adjacent customer premises equipment markets to its Western Electric affiliate.  In this context, 
there was a strong economic rationale for neutrality regulation.  
C.  Vertical Relationships in the Absence of Binding Regulation  
In the case of an unregulated firm, or one where profit regulation is non-existent or not 
binding, the tactics to maximize profits are different.  In particular, without such regulation the 
firm faces no such incentives to shift profits from the regulated side of its business to the less 
regulated portion of its business.   
Under the classic Chicago School “one monopoly rent” theory, a firm with market power 
at one stage of the production and distribution process can extract all of the monopoly rent 
without integrating or contracting with other levels of the production or distribution process.
13  
However, the “post-Chicago” economics literature shows that under certain conditions a firm 
with monopoly power in one market can potentially use such power to increase profits by 
influencing competition in related lines of commerce.
14   
The economic literature on vertical relationships has gone through a significant 
transformation, from broad agreement that vertical integration was bad to the Chicago School 
view that close vertical relationships are usually motivated by procompetitive efficiency reasons, 
to the current nuanced “post-Chicago” view that under certain conditions there can be 
 
13 The Chicago school view is that vertical restraints can only be anticompetitive if they somehow lead to a 
reduction in competition in the upstream market.  For example, there could be a competitive problem if wireless 
carrier handset restrictions reduced competition in the handset industry. 
14 See, for example, Farrell and Weiser (2003).        7
                                                
competitive concerns with vertical relationships.  Economic thinking informs current antitrust 
doctrine, which generally presumes that vertical relations are not anticompetitive, unless a fact 
intensive investigation shows otherwise. 
In antitrust, “naked price fixing” is per se illegal since, almost by definition, it rarely has 
any efficiency-enhancing justification.
15  In contrast, most vertical relationships are treated under 
the “rule of reason” standard because there can be procompetitive efficiency justifications for 
practices even if they also have anticompetitive effects. 
A large economics literature details efficiency rationales for vertical restrictions on 
suppliers or distributors.  The efficiency rationales usually involve an attempt to align incentives 
of upstream and downstream firms.  For example, firms may want to ensure that downstream 
distributors do not exercise market power and mark up prices too much (avoiding  double 
marginalization), provide sufficient customer support and product promotion (solving free rider 
problems), and maintain quality (avoiding misplaced blame for product problems).
16  Similarly, 
firms may want to ensure that upstream suppliers conduct the optimal amount of investment 
(avoid the hold-up problem), produce compatible, complementary products, and maintain quality 
(avoiding misplaced blame for product problems).  In these cases, vertical restrictions can align 
the incentives of the monopoly provider and upstream and downstream players in a way that can 
increase economic efficiency and lead to the development of new and/or improved products and 
services.   
In telecommunications and media, network providers want to enhance the demand for 
their services, in part by promoting complementary services, such as with the early cable content 
investments discussed below.  A network provider cannot extract rents from services that do not 
exist.  Thus, there may be a number of efficiency rationales for a telecommunications network 
provider to implement vertical restrictions.  There may also be an incentive to exclude or raise 
the costs of those that offer content that competes with its own, especially if the content produces 
negative external effects on the overall consumer demand.
17   
In a competitive network market, network providers have an added incentive to 
incorporate third-party content or applications into their service offerings.  Network providers 
 
15 Naked price fixing is an agreement to fix prices without any offsetting benefits such as integrating production or 
distribution.  
16 For a summary, see Rey and Tirole (2007). 
17 For a discussion of incentives for a “platform monopolist” to exclude upstream suppliers see Farrell and Weiser 
(2003).       8
profit by offering attractive packages to consumers.  A network provider that restricts access to 
desirable third-party content will lose business to rivals that are open to that content.  Thus, one 
dimension of the competitive rivalry between network providers is how open they make their 
networks to third-party content and applications.  
For example, early cable system operators invested in cable programming channels to 
ensure availability of programming.  Waterman and Weiss (1997) discuss how cable system 
operators had an incentive to expand their systems if they also had additional programming, but 
programmers would be reluctant to invest in programming without an assured outlet for their 
product.  By investing directly in the early cable programming channels, cable system operators 
were able to break the logjam created by this “chicken and egg” problem and at the same time 
alleviate the bilateral monopoly bargaining problem that could have ensued once each of the 
parties had made major sunk investments (in programming or in cable infrastructure).  
In theory, vertical relationships when there is market power at some level could hurt 
consumers, help consumers, or both help them in some ways and hurt them in others.  The 
outcome will depend on market structure and the competitive and regulatory environment.  In 
almost all models that predict adverse competitive effects from vertical relationships, the adverse 
effects arise because of market power at one level of the vertical chain.  However, vertical 
relationships often raise no competitive issues even if a firm has market power.  In other cases, 
adverse effects may be less costly to consumers than inefficiencies that might arise from 
regulatory intervention.  The regulatory and antitrust authorities should only intervene when it is 
determined after a detailed factual investigation that: 1) a firm with market power takes actions 
that harms not just competing firms, but the competitive process and consumer welfare; and 2) 
that the regulatory intervention promotes, rather than hinders consumer welfare.   
There have been situations where vertical restraints imposed by telecommunications 
network providers harm consumers and regulatory intervention ameliorates the problem without 
consumer harm.  One recent regulatory investigation found that a telecommunications network 
provider had the ability and incentive to harm competition in vertically-related markets.  In the 
2005 Madison River case, Madison River, an incumbent local wireline telephone provider had 
been blocking ports that would have allowed its high-speed DSL customers to use Vonage, a 
voice-over-Internet-Protocol (“VoIP”) provider.  Vonage’s service competes directly with the 
voice telephone service provided by Madison River.  Without access to the blocked ports,       9
                                                
Madison River’s DSL customers would not be able to access a competing wireline voice service 
unless they could and did switch to cable high-speed service.  Ultimately, the FCC entered into a 
consent decree with Madison River, a rural local exchange carrier, in which Madison River 
agreed that it would not block ports used for VoIP applications.
18  In this case, the FCC moved 
relatively quickly, which is important when relying on ex post enforcement. 
There are also situations where vertical restraints imposed by telecommunications 
network providers may restrict consumer choice, but the impact of the restriction or regulatory 
intervention on overall consumer welfare is unclear.  AT&T has not allowed the Skype 
application for the iPhone to work on its 3G data network.  AT&T does not impose the same 
restrictions on most other third-party applications.  One explanation for the Skype restriction 
may be that AT&T does not want users to substitute Skype minutes for voice minutes.  
Alternative explanations could be that the quality of the Skype experience would be degraded 
and users might view that as a network problem creating a bad reputation and increased costs for 
AT&T or that Skype uses a disproportionate amount of bandwidth and AT&T is not set to charge 
for the bandwidth usage.  Under antitrust principles, there is no general duty to deal with rivals.
  
However, in networked industries working with rivals may be critical to a competitor’s success, 
even for a more efficient and innovative competitor, so blanket immunity from a duty to deal 
may not be the best competition policy. 
The recent relationship between Yahoo! and AT&T also provides an example of the 
concerns expressed about and potential efficiencies from vertical relationships.  Yahoo! and 
AT&T have had an agreement jointly to provide service for AT&T’s DSL customers.  This 
vertical relationship advantaged Yahoo! relative to other information portals such as AOL, MSN, 
and Google.
19  But it does not appear to have harmed consumers.  Bundled AT&T/Yahoo! 
service does not prevent subscribers from using any other Internet services, including Yahoo!’s 
most direct competitors.  In principle, AT&T could make it more difficult for users to turn to 
rival sources of aggregated content and premium service, but we are not aware of any allegations 
of such behavior.  In these circumstances, a policy that prevents a relationship between AT&T 
 
18 FCC, Consent Decree, In the Matter of Madison River Communications, LLC and affiliated companies, File No. 
EB-05-IH-0110, March 3, 2005. 
19 In a similar vein, Microsoft is the default search engine for Verizon Wireless, but users can still access Google 
and Yahoo! search engines on their phones.       10
                                                
and Yahoo! could deny consumers a more attractive product or lower cost.  And AT&T, because 
it competes with other high-speed Internet providers has a strong incentive to provide an 
attractive package of content to consumers.  Rivals to Yahoo! may protest the vertical 
relationship Yahoo! has with AT&T.  But their protests need not stem from fear of 
discriminatory treatment by AT&T; they may fear a more effective competitor in Yahoo!    
In a network market with considerable competition between network operators there is 
little competitive concern about preferred supplier relationships.  Competing providers have a 
strong incentive to provide the most attractive package to their end consumers, and will enter 
into agreements with content providers for obtaining the content that gives them a competitive 
advantage.  For example, consider the audio systems installed in all new cars as the default 
option.  Car manufacturers (like network operators) have entered into agreements with various 
audio system providers to provide audio system options.  The competition among car 
manufacturers for sales to end consumers causes manufacturers to provide the most attractive 
package of options, including audio systems.  And the various suppliers of audio systems, such 
as Pioneer and Alpine, compete with each other to be primary providers for different 
manufacturers.  In such a market there is little competitive concern about vertical restrictions and 
exclusive relationships.     
In a recent article, van Schewick (2007) argues that certain environments will make it 
more likely that network operators discriminate against upstream providers.  Her analysis 
reinforces the idea that such possibilities depend on the economic circumstances.  Upstream, 
complementary markets that exhibit increasing returns to scale, network effects, externalities to 
the network provider, or products that can be easily banned from a network, make it more likely 
that a network provider will find it profitable to discriminate.  There is a tradeoff between the 
possible welfare loss from restricting complementary service and the benefits that network 
providers and their consumers receive when complementary products enhance and improve the 
customer’s experience of the network.
20  The magnitudes of these costs and benefits are industry 
and company specific.  Importantly, the van Schewick article:  1) is based on a model in which 
specific circumstances will overwhelmingly dictate the efficient result; 2) simply assumes that if 
discrimination could occur, it is bad for competitors, but does not evaluate the resulting impact 
 
20 Farrell and Weiser (2003) discuss these conditions and term it ICE (internalizing complementary externalities).  
The extent to which the network provider can internalize these complementary externalities will affect the incentive 
to restrict inefficiently. on consumer welfare; and 3) does not assess the costs of preventing potentially efficient 
integration.  A consumer welfare analysis must look at both the costs and benefits of potential 
rules – whereas the van Schewick analysis focuses only on the gross potential benefits from 
instituting a non-discrimination rule. 
D.  Procompetitive Reasons for Wireless Carriers to Restrict Access 
As discussed above, wireless providers might restrict access to their networks for a 
number of reasons.  For example, wireless providers have to manage their networks to serve a 
large number of heterogeneous customers, which can mean denying some groups certain features 
and rights to increase the experience for other groups.  For example, bandwidth intensive users 
downloading video may reduce the quality of service for other users who are making voice calls.  
A wireless provider wants to maximize profits from its network and from services riding 
on top of its network, in competition with other wireless (and wireline) networks and their 
associated services.  The wireless provider has an incentive to maximize profit over the entire set 
of possible groups of consumers.  At the same time, technology entrepreneurs might develop a 
product or service targeted at a subset of the entire population, such as in the video example 
above.  The incentives of the technology entrepreneur may differ from those of the network 
operator and servicing the technology entrepreneur’s niche group of consumers may cause 
disruption to the service available to the provider’s other customers.
21   
Consider a simple, stylized model of a network provider and an upstream provider whose 
application rides on top of the network.  For simplicity, assume a monopolistic network provider.  
This provider sells access to its wireless network to q1 customers at a price of p1.  Quantity 
demanded is a downward sloping function of price such that  ) ( 1 1 1 p q q =  and  .  Each 
additional customer on the network imposes a cost of c
0 ) ( ' 1 1 < p q
1 > 0 on the provider.
22
A second good, an application, can be sold on the network.  Assume for simplicity that 
demand for this second good is completely independent of demand for the wireless network and 
that there are no vertical efficiencies.
23  The application has a downward sloping demand 
where  .  Like most software, the marginal production cost for this  ) ( 2 2 2 p q q = 0 ) ( ' 2 2 < p q
                                                 
21 We want to be clear that this is simply an example that shows that there can be procompetitive vertical restrictions 
and justifications for service restrictions.  Similar justifications may not always hold. 
22 Note that with congestion costs, c1' > 0 also and the results from this section would be stronger. 
      11
23 At the end of this section, we discuss some implications of relaxing this assumption.   application is close to zero.  However, because this application utilizes the wireless network’s 
resources, each customer who uses this application imposes a cost, c2≥0, on the wireless 
provider.
24  
If the network provider supplies both the network and the application, the provider will 
maximize its profit function:  .  Because 
demand for the two goods are independent, the first order condition for the application good is: 
12
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If an outside entrepreneur supplies only the application, because he does not internalize 
the cost of the application imposed on the network, the entrepreneur will maximize the following 
profit function:  with the corresponding first order condition: 
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where   is the application quantity sold by the entrepreneur. 
2
E q
The assumption of independent demands makes the result simpler and stronger.  If the 
demand for the application increases demand for the network, then the price differential would 
be less.  For example, voice telephone service rides on top of the wireless network.  The network 
provider in all cases provides the voice application because of the beneficial effects it gets for 
network demand.   
Because the incentives of wireless network providers can differ from a technology 
entrepreneur developing a niche service, it may be procompetitive for the network operator to 
restrict the ability for the entrepreneur to serve some subset of customers.  Of course, such 
restrictions could also be motivated by anticompetitive incentives.  
One critical aspect of this model is the inability or unwillingness of the network provider 
to charge exactly the cost that usage imposes on the network.  If a wireless network provider 
were able to charge differentially for all usage, then incentives would be aligned.  However, 
there are a number of reasons why networks may be unwilling or unable to charge consumers for 
every cost-causing use of the network.  For example, with uncertainty, consumers may 
                                                 
      12
24 The cost from congestion can be thought of as poorer network quality for the other subscribers, but that could be 
mitigated by additional capital investment by the network operator.       13
                                                
sufficiently value “unlimited” or high usage plans such that marginal charges may not be optimal 
for a profit maximizing network provider.
25  As a result, a provider may not price network usage 
at its cost for specific times and locations where costs are high.  While wireless networks offer 
lower priced voice packages on nights and weekends, they do not charge higher prices for data 
usage at their most congested cell sites as such plans could be very complicated for consumers.  
Instead of pricing usage on a real-time, location-specific basis, one way to deal with the 
congestion issue is to prevent (or charge a premium for) the most likely causes of congestion – 
services that demand high bandwidth in a short period of time.  
This simple model provides a framework for understanding much of the debate about 
“network management.”  Wireless network providers claim they need to be able to impose 
restrictions on usage for “reasonable network management” but “reasonable network 
management” has no clear definition.  There are circumstances in which a network provider 
could restrict certain uses to enhance the overall value of the network to its customers and other 
circumstances in which the network provider could restrict certain uses in a way that harms 
consumers. 
1.  Example:  High Bandwidth Use Restrictions 
Some wireless providers have imposed usage restrictions on high bandwidth users of 
wireless data cards (Verizon, Sprint and AT&T offer 5GB per month plans with charges for 
usage beyond that amount; T-Mobile offers an unlimited data plan).
26  One explanation for the 
cap is that the wireless providers do not want some users to consume disproportionate amounts 
of bandwidth and want all users to receive good quality of service.  
Wireless providers have a scarce resource – network bandwidth – that they need to 
manage to ensure that they can provide services for which their consumers wish to pay.  As such, 
they have acquired licenses to spectrum (although licenses may not be absolutely necessary to 
provide wireless service) and invested in cell sites, backhaul, switching, and interconnection 
facilities.  And they have millions of customers on their networks.  Capacity of a wireless 
network is essentially a function of the amount of bandwidth, the amount invested in cell sites 
 
25 There is a lengthy literature on consumers choosing plans for telephone and electricity suitable for much higher 
usage than they end up using.  See Grubb (2008). 
26 Carrier websites, accessed March 29, 2009.  Wireless carriers do not at this time appear to have limits on data 
usage for non-tethered handheld devices.       14
(both the number of sites and the number of radios, smart antennas, and other equipment at each 
site) and the backhaul capacity of the network.  To manage network capacity, wireless providers 
decide how much to invest and how much to charge customers for their usage.  Also, of 
particular import to this policy discussion, they decide which devices and applications can run on 
their networks.   
Because at any point in time, there is a limited amount of spectrum and the wireless 
network configuration has a fixed number of cell sites (and sectors), there is a bandwidth limit in 
each (small) geographic area that has to be shared among users in the same cell sector.  If one 
user is downloading video, she may be using a disproportionate share of the available bandwidth, 
which in turn can affect the experience for other users.    
Thus, there is a need for the wireless provider to manage this scarce resource.  As 
discussed above, the current responses by wireless providers to impose monthly download limits 
do not seem to address optimally the scarcity problem because scarcity occurs at specific cell 
sites at specific times.  One way for a network provider to manage its spectrum is to limit 
bandwidth intensive uses.  Another network management tool would be if the provider were able 
to determine which types of applications were delay-tolerant, and then allocate bandwidth among 
delay-tolerant and delay-intolerant uses so as to increase network quality for its customers.    
This network capacity allocation problem is an example of the more general economic 
issue of managing scarce common resources.  For example, restaurants serve dinner to multiple 
customers who all enjoy the same ambience and service staff.  One noisy or especially 
demanding diner affects how much other patrons enjoy their meals.  Society relies on market 
forces (competition among restaurants) to give restaurant owners appropriate incentives to deal 
efficiently with such patrons, but owner’s decisions may not mean that all customers get the 
same service even in the same restaurant when they order exactly the same meals.  In a 
competitive business like restaurants, management of the common resource will differ based on 
the demands of customers, costs, and other factors and restaurants offer different “business 
models” to attract different types of patrons.  
Like restaurants, wireless networks must satisfy widely varying demands for service.  
Some people use their connections sparingly, while others consume large amounts of bandwidth.  
On the wireline side, initial proposals for network neutrality and openness did not differentiate 
among different types of users.  This type of network management regulation could harm       15
consumers even if there were only a single, monopoly, broadband network. More recent 
proposals recognize the need to allow network owners to charge for bandwidth or usage in some 
circumstances.  For wireless users, there is already a well-accepted set of monthly charges for 
certain “buckets” of voice usage and additional charges for minutes of use above the buckets. 
Differential pricing can be an important tool for allocating the scarce capacity needed to 
provide higher-value services.  All packets do not have equal value.  Voice service places a 
premium on instantaneous communications.  But delay is acceptable for some data services and 
not for others.  For example, e-mail is generally somewhat delay-tolerant, but delay on a VoIP 
service makes the service much less usable.   
Given capacity constraints in the network, the lack of prioritization could cause the VoIP 
quality to be suboptimal, even though delay in delivering e-mails to or from the iPhone would be 
completely inconsequential because such transmissions are easily buffered.  Requiring a network 
operator to treat all bits equally would needlessly harm certain high-value services, reducing 
consumer welfare.  
Network management issues are not unique to wireless.  Many industries have customers 
that make intensive use of resources, and those users typically pay for that usage.  Wireless 
should be no different – those who cause the costs should be charged for their usage if that is not 
too burdensome.  The degree of competition among network providers is irrelevant to the 
argument that users who impose costs on others should pay for those externalities.    When there 
are competitive networks, rivalry among providers includes differing approaches to network 
management. 
While there may be anticompetitive incentives for network operators in their network 
management, it is well-accepted in antitrust that competition at the network level reduces the 
ability of network operators to impose anticompetitive restrictions.  The next section looks at the 
nature of competition in the wireless industry to assess the ability of wireless providers to impose 
inefficient restrictions that harm consumers.  
III.  Competition in the U.S. Wireless Industry  
An antitrust evaluation of the need for Carterfone style regulation of wireless providers 
depends on the current and future state of competition in the wireless industry and in upstream       16
                                                
markets for equipment and applications.  In an environment of vigorous competition, there is 
little incentive for competing wireless providers to impose restrictions on upstream equipment 
and application suppliers unless those restrictions are efficiency enhancing.  If on the other hand, 
a wireless firm has substantial market power, then it might be able to use that power to exclude 
or extract rents from upstream providers and harm consumers through a variety of vertical 
restraints.  Whether a firm with such market power would take advantage of its power would 
also depend on the nature of demand of its subscribers.
27   
We start by examining the downstream market, the market where wireless providers 
compete to offer wireless service to consumers.
28  We do not undertake an examination of the 
relevant antitrust market, but instead rely on the Department of Justice and FCC findings in 
several merger cases and use wireless network operation as the relevant market for analytical 
purposes.  The wireless marketplace is not perfectly competitive – the cost to set up a wireless 
telephone network is substantial, and there are a limited number of licenses for spectrum suitable 
to provide high-quality mobile wireless service in an economical manner.  At the same time, the 
four major national wireless providers face considerable competitive pressures, and operate in a 
market environment very different from the AT&T regulated monopoly that existed at the time 
of the Carterfone decision.  The FCC has consistently found that there is effective competition in 
the wireless market, most recently in the Thirteenth Annual CMRS Report that was released in 
January 2009.
29  In this section we assess the evidence about the competitiveness of the wireless 
sector. 
A.  Downstream Market Structure 
1.  Nationwide Wireless Providers 
There are 4 major “nationwide” wireless providers:  Verizon Wireless (“Verizon”), 
AT&T, Sprint Nextel (“Sprint”) and T-Mobile USA (“T-Mobile).  Verizon and AT&T have a 
technical advantage in many areas because they have 850 MHz cellular licenses covering a large 
part of the U.S. while Sprint and T-Mobile primarily rely on higher frequency PCS (1.9GHz) 
spectrum.  For comparison purposes, using CDMA2000 technology, a cell site broadcasting at 
 
27 See Cramton, Skrzypacz and Wilson (2007).  
28 This analysis follows Mayo (2008). 
29 FCC (2009) (“Thirteenth CMRS Report”).         17
                                                
850MHz has a radius of 29.4 km while a cell site broadcasting at 1.9 GHz, the PCS spectrum, 
has a radius of 13.3 km and a cell site broadcasting at 2.5 GHz has a radius of 10.0 km.
30  The 
lower frequency spectrum is particularly valuable outside major metropolitan areas because the 
greater coverage per cell site reduces capital and operating costs.
31  Due in part to their better 
coverage, which comes in part due to their “better” spectrum, AT&T and Verizon have more 
subscribers and have been increasing subscribers more rapidly than their nationwide competitors.  
In addition, Verizon and AT&T were the top two purchasers of spectrum in the 2008 700 MHz 
auction, which has similar coverage characteristics as the 850 MHz frequencies.   
At the same time, there is competition from Sprint, T-Mobile and regional providers.  T-
Mobile has been increasing its absolute and relative share of subscribers even though its primary 
operations are on high-frequency PCS spectrum.  In 2006, T-Mobile purchased a large amount of 
spectrum in the Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) band and has been working on increasing its 
capacity and coverage with this newly acquired spectrum.  
The four nationwide carriers built their current nationwide footprints through primary and 
secondary license acquisitions and build out.  The competitive consequences of consolidation 
need to be examined on a case-by-case basis.  While consolidation can potentially lead to 
increased market power of certain providers, it can also enable a provider to achieve economies 
of scale and operating efficiencies that reduce costs and allow the newly merged firm to compete 
more aggressively.  Several recent acquisitions have enabled the nationwide carriers to continue 
to expand and fill in their footprints and increase the capacity of their existing networks.  In 
November 2007, AT&T acquired Dobson Communications, which used the Cellular One brand 
in rural and suburban areas in several states.  In February 2008, AT&T completed its acquisition 
of spectrum licenses from Aloha Partners and T-Mobile completed its acquisition of SunCom 
Wireless Holdings, a regional wireless provider in the Southeast.  In August 2008, Verizon 
acquired Rural Cellular, which provided wireless service in rural areas in several states.  In 
November 2008, Sprint and Clearwire closed their transaction to form a new wireless company 
potentially offering mobile WiMax service.  And in January 2009, Verizon completed its 
acquisition of Alltel.  While these acquisitions have reduced the number of wireless providers 
 
30 CDMA Development Group (2004).  
31 In more densely populated urban areas, the larger coverage radius is less of an advantage, because capacity rather 
than coverage is important.  However, the lower frequency transmissions are also better at penetrating buildings, 
giving them an operational advantage in urban areas also.       18
                                                
nationwide, they were all approved by the Commission and Department of Justice, sometimes 
with requirements to divest licenses in specific geographic markets.     
2.  Regional Wireless Providers and MVNOs 
In addition to the nationwide providers, there are a number of significant regional 
providers, including Leap Wireless, US Cellular, and MetroPCS.  These regional providers, and 
other smaller providers, can offer nationwide coverage to their subscribers through roaming 
agreements.  Leap and MetroPCS also acquired AWS spectrum to allow them to build out 
networks across the country.  In addition, regional providers can serve those consumers who 
primarily value wireless service for use in their local areas and are not willing to pay much more 
for nationwide service, or only use out of area service sparingly.  Consumers can also purchase 
wireless service from mobile virtual network operators (MVNOs) who lease wholesale capacity 
from the facilities-based carriers, but set prices independently.  MVNOs typically use different 
branding strategies to market to particular niche groups.  The most significant MVNOs include 
TracFone Wireless, Virgin Mobile, and Boost Mobile.  Industry commentators debate the 
competitive importance of MVNOs, but they offer service alternatives.  
3.  Concentration in the Wireless Industry 
A first cut in assessing competition in an industry is to look at measures of the 
Herfindhal-Hirschman Index (HHI).
32  In the Thirteenth CMRS Report, the Commission 
calculated that the average HHI for mobile wireless services for 176 Economic Areas was 2,674 
as of December 2007.
33  This compares to Commission calculations of an average HHI of 2,674 
in 2006, 2,706 in 2005, 2,450 in 2004 and 2,151 in 2003.
34  In all of these years, the HHI is in 
what the DOJ/FTC Merger Guidelines calls “Highly Concentrated.”  The jump in the HHI in 
2004 was a mainly result of the Cingular/AT&T Wireless and Sprint/Nextel mergers.  The 
generally flat recent trend in HHIs since 2004 suggests that even though there has been 
 
32 HHIs are calculating by summing the squares of the individual market shares of the firms participating in a 
relevant market. A market with a monopoly provider has an HHI of 10,000. A market with five equally sized 
competitors has an HHI of 2000, calculated as 5 x (20 x 20). 
33 The Commission calculates the HHI based on the number of subscribers served by each carrier in 176 Economic 
Areas (“EAs”).  HHIs for each EA are weighted by the EA population to come up with a nationwide average. 
Thirteenth CMRS Report, ¶¶45-46.  
34 Ninth, Tenth, Eleventh and Twelfth CMRS Reports.        19
                                                
consolidation as measured at the national level, major providers have expanded their geographic 
footprints rather than increased concentration within established markets.  
Another indicator of industry structure is the number of wireless provider choices 
available to consumers.  In the Thirteenth CMRS Report, the Commission estimates that as of 
July 2008, 90.5% of the total U.S. population had four or more wireless service providers in the 
census blocks in which they live.
35  Table 1 shows that in general more and more of the U.S. 
population live in areas with more and more choice in providers, although in 2006 there was 
some decrease after the Sprint Nextel merger.  Most of the U.S. population has more wireless 
choices than eight years ago.  
A potential concern is the weakening position of Sprint.  Sprint has experienced two 
straight years of subscriber losses, losing 5.1 million direct wireless subscribers in 2008 and 
659,000 direct subscribers in 2007.
36  Sprint credits most of this loss to higher churn rates 
relative to competitors, already high penetration rates in most markets, and a move towards 
increasing the credit quality of its customers.
37  To the extent that Sprint’s declining customer 
base and market position continue, there could potentially be concerns related to concentration 
within the industry, but it could also lead to more aggressive pricing and competition by Sprint to 
regain lost share.  For example, Sprint appears to be very active in the wholesale market which 
could lead to new products and services. 
4.  Entry and Potential Barriers to Entry 
The next thing to consider is the ability of wireless providers to enter and compete in 
various geographic markets, either by existing providers expanding their footprints or by new 
entry.  There are two potential barriers to entry in the wireless market:  spectrum and economies 
of scale.   
Mobile wireless service requires access to spectrum.  The U.S., has two categories of 
spectrum – licensed and unlicensed.  To date, unlicensed spectrum has been useful for portable 
use such as WiFi, but not mobile use.  The only significant providers of mobile wireless services 
use licensed spectrum.   
 
35 Thirteenth CMRS Report, ¶¶39-43. 
36 SprintNextel 2008 10-K, p. 30. 
37 SprintNextel 2008 10-K, p. 34.       20
                                                
As a result, for now, available spectrum is limited by the licenses issued by the FCC in 
frequencies capable of providing mobile service.
38  Starting in the mid 1990s, a series of FCC 
auctions significantly increased the amount of spectrum available for mobile wireless, which in 
turn led to a significant increase in the number of providers offering wireless service in most 
geographic areas.  Most recently, the 2006 Advanced Wireless Services (AWS) auction (Auction 
66) increased the spectrum available for wireless by 90 MHz and the 700MHz auction (Auction 
73) increased the amount of available spectrum by another 62 MHz.  
In the 2006 AWS auction, T-Mobile acquired licenses that should enable it to offer a 
wireless broadband network, and smaller regional wireless providers such as Leap and 
MetroPCS acquired licenses that allow them to expand their geographic coverage areas.  In the 
same auction, new entrant SpectrumCo LLC, an entity owned by the major cable companies 
acquired a near national spectrum footprint of 20 MHz.  However, SpectrumCo indicated in its 
press release that its members “did not approach this investment with the intent of becoming the 
nation’s fifth wireless provider but rather to gain the flexibility to develop advanced wireless 
services…[and] no specific  plans to build out the networks at this time.”
39   
In the 700 MHz auction, several new and/or smaller providers were also able to acquire 
spectrum, although no party other than Verizon and AT&T acquired enough two-way spectrum 
for a national footprint.
40  
Starting in 2004, the FCC began modifying the band plan and rules for 2500-2690 MHz 
(“BRS/EBS band”) spectrum.  This spectrum is being used by Clearwire to develop a WiMAX 
network that will offer wireless broadband service.
41  As of December 2008, Clearwire’s U.S. 
network covered 47 markets and 15.3 million people with a subscriber base of 475,000.  As a 
complement to its broadband services, Clearwire offers VoIP telephony services to 45 U.S. 
markets.
42 In October of 2008, Clearwire combined WiMax capabilities with Sprint.
43    
 
38 Mayo and Wallsten (2009) document the rise of secondary market transactions for spectrum use that can help to 
increase the effciency of spectrum use, but not increase the amount of licensed spectrum. 
39 Comcast (2006). 
40 The FCC’s Thirteenth CMRS Report states that new entrant Frontier Wireless, owned by the satellite television 
company Echostar, won enough licenses to establish a near national footprint, but that was 6 MHz of unpaired 
spectrum, leading some to speculate that it will add video to mobile phones (Avery, 2008).   
41 WiMax is an IEEE 802.16 standard for broadband wireless access.  
42 Clearwire (2009), p. 2. 
43 Clearwire (2008).       21
                                                
Thus, recent auctions have allowed some new entrants and regional players to build and 
expand their geographic footprints.  Because many of the new entrants are still starting their 
businesses, only time will tell whether these auctions will facilitate significant new competitors.  
New entrants also face non-spectrum barriers to entry, arising from economies of scale in 
production and marketing.  Wireless service requires significant investment in network 
infrastructure, with large upfront fixed-cost capital investments.  And to compete against 
nationwide incumbents, a new entrant or regional provider needs to acquire a significant 
geographic footprint or enter into roaming agreements 
Moreover, the 700 MHz auction was likely the last auction of significant amounts of 
spectrum for some time and offered highly valuable low-frequency spectrum.  The largest 
incumbent nationwide providers, AT&T and Verizon, acquired considerable additional spectrum 
in that auction and through secondary market transactions.  Sprint and T-Mobile did not 
participate in that auction. 
B.  Wireless Market Performance: Prices, Quantities, and Quality  
1.  Prices 
While structural measures such as HHIs provide a starting place, industry structure is just 
a first step in an antitrust analysis assessing the competitiveness of the wireless market.  The next 
step is to assess the actual performance of the industry, as measured by prices and quantities 
consumed.  Table 2 and Chart 1 show the significant decrease in average revenue per minute 
(ARPM) and average voice revenue per voice minute (AVRPM) from 1995 through 2007.
44 As 
of 2007, ARPM was $0.06 and AVRPM was $0.05.  And while the pace of declining prices has 
slowed as the industry has matured, price declines in the last 5 years are still substantial, with 
AVRPM falling by over 50% since 2003.  
The distinction between ARPM and AVRPM has become important only in the last few 
years with the growth of data services.  Because ARPM is calculated using voice minutes as the 
 
44 Based on Thirteenth CMRS Report, ¶193, Table 12.  The FCC’s analysis is based on data from CTIA’s semi-
annual surveys.  CTIA’s semi-annual surveys are voluntary, meaning the companies that respond to particular 
questions may differ from year to year and not all companies respond to every question each year.  CTIA reports the 
raw results from the survey and does not attempt to adjust the figures for the non-respondents or to make the results 
exactly comparable year-to-year. Thus, the figures from the CTIA surveys indicate trends, but cannot be presumed 
to show the precise level of changes.       22
                                                
denominator, it has become inaccurate as a price metric.  AVRPM, which excludes revenue from 
data services, is a more accurate measure of price trends for voice services.  
The national providers and the major regional providers all offer calling plans with 
various buckets of minutes (e.g., 900 minutes for $59.99 per month) that can be used without 
roaming or long distance charges.  There are many variants of these plans, including plans with 
free calling to designated numbers or to customers using the same wireless provider, unlimited 
local calling plans, and unlimited national calling plans.  Carriers continue to experiment with 
different plans, and consumers typically have considerable choice among plans within and across 
carriers. 
Some evidence suggests that the price of data services has been declining in the last few 
years, after increasing between 2002 and 2005.  Although pay-as-you-go text messaging prices 
have increased recently, the Thirteenth CMRS Report indicates that average revenue per text 
message declined from $0.037 per text message in 2005 to $0.025 in 2007 as monthly text 
messaging plans (as opposed to pay-as-you-go pricing) became more prevalent.
45  By the first 
half of 2008, average revenue per text message fell to $0.013.
46   
2.  Subscribers, Minutes of Use and Data Usage 
Wireless use has also increased significantly, whether measured by subscribers, minutes 
of use or data usage.  In its most recent data, the FCC estimates that there were 263.0 million 
subscribers at the end of 2007, implying a penetration rate of 86% and a 23% increase in 
subscribers between December 2005 and December 2007.
47  See Table 3.  And an increasing 
number of subscribers are “wireless only;” recent estimates suggest that more than 20% of 
households are wireless only.
48  
Average voice minutes of use have also continued to increase.  As shown in Table 3, 
average monthly voice minutes of use per subscriber increased to 769 in 2007, an increase of 
80% since 2002.   
 
45 Thirteenth CMRS Report, ¶194; Twelfth CMRS Report, ¶¶202-203. 
46 This is calculated using data from the CTIA mid-year 2008 report. Six month text revenues are divided by six 
month text traffic. 
47 The FCC estimates subscribers using NRUF data filed by all wireless carriers with the FCC.  CTIA survey data 
shows a similar pattern. See CTIA Midyear 2008 Results.  
48 Blumberg and Luke (2009).        23
                                                
Many indicators suggest that mobile data usage has also increased significantly in recent 
years.  According to CTIA (2008), data revenues accounted for 20.37% of total wireless service 
revenues in the first half of 2008.  Several sources indicate that the percentage of subscribers 
using their wireless phones for data services continues to increase.  For example, Nielsen (2008) 
indicates that 37% of subscribers paid for access to the mobile Internet in the first quarter of 
2008.  CTIA (2008) data indicate that the volume of text/SMS messages in the first six months of 
2008 increased to 384.97 billion, an increase of 162% over the first six months of 2007 and 
494% over the first six months of 2006.  See Table 4.  CTIA (2008) data also indicates that the 
volume of multimedia messages (MMS) such as photo messaging has been increasing 
dramatically, with 5.63 billion MMS messages in the first six months of 2008, an increase of 
116% over the first six months of 2007.  
3.  Churn 
Monthly churn statistics provide a measure of consumer switching between carriers.  
Most carriers have been reporting churn rates in the range of 1.5% to 3.0% per month, with an 
average churn rate of 1.9% in first quarter 2008, implying annual churn of more than 20%.   
Despite FCC rules adopted in 2003 that require wireless providers to allow customers to 
port their phone numbers, churn rates have been declining in recent years.  Providers have been 
investing in their networks – digital technology has been increasingly deployed and cell sites 
grew about 15% per year over the past 10 years and about 9% per year for the past 5 years.
49  
Although concerns about network quality are still raised, recent survey evidence suggests that 
call quality is improving,
50 and that poor call quality is highly correlated with customers’ desire 
to switch carriers.
51  
Because call quality affects customer churn, it is not surprising that as customers gain 
experience on wireless networks and call quality improves that churn would decrease.  Even 
without increasing call quality, customer sorting as customers gain experience with different 
wireless networks would decrease churn.  For example, if new customers are likely to churn, but 
existing customers are not, a decreasing proportion of new customers as the installed base grows 
 
49 CTIA (2008), Table 64. 
50 J.D. Power and Associates (2006); and Gonsalves (2005). 
51 J.D. Power and Associates (2006); and Gonsalves (2005).       24
                                                
would naturally lead to a smaller churn.  Experienced customers would be less likely to churn 
because they have already had the chance to try one or more networks at home and at work so 
are more likely to have found the most appropriate carrier for their individual calling patterns. 
AT&T and T-Mobile provide prospective customers with detailed coverage information 
to encourage customers to enroll in their plans.
52 Analysts believe that these efforts coupled with 
improved customer care, better deals on handsets, and bigger incentives for longer contracts have 
helped to reduce the level of churn.
53  Thus, decreasing churn rates probably do not reflect a 
decrease in consumer choice but rather an increase in the quality of customer experience and, 
over time, the ability of continuing wireless customers to sort to their preferred provider.   
4.  Technological Innovation 
In the U.S., wireless providers use two main digital technologies, CDMA and GSM.
54  
CDMA and GSM are referred to as “2G” technologies.  Equipment manufacturers have been 
developing more advanced “next generation” technologies that allow for increased voice 
capacity and higher transfer rates for mobile broadband.
55  The four nationwide wireless 
providers and the significant regional providers have been deploying these next generation 
technologies, leading to much greater availability of mobile broadband, which is now generally 
available to most consumers.
56  The FCC estimates that as of May 2008, 92.5% of the population 
lived in census blocks with one or more provider of mobile broadband and 72.5% of the 
population lived in census blocks with two or more providers of mobile broadband.   
Deployment of next-generation technologies is an important part of the competitive 
dynamic in the wireless industry.  Next-generation network upgrades allow carriers to improve 
the coverage, capacity, and capabilities of their networks, leading to improvements in service 
quality improvements for voice calls,
57 and the development of new mobile data services.  The 
 
52 Kesmodel (2005); T-Mobile, “Personal Coverage Check,” available at http://www.t-mobile.com/coverage 
(hyperlink “check your coverage now”) (last visited March 27, 2009); http://www.wireless.att.com/cell-
phoneservice/welcome/index.jsp (hyperlink “Coverage Viewer”) (last visited March 27, 2009). 
53 Eleventh CMRS Report ¶148.  
54 AT&T and T-Mobile use GSM; Verizon and Sprint use CDMA.  
55 The many variants of next-generation technologies are sometimes referred to as 2.5G, 3G, or 4G, depending on 
their technical characteristics.  
56 For these purposes “mobile broadband” is defined as WCDMA/HSPDA or EV-DO/EV-DO Rev. A technologies. 
Thirteenth CMRS Report, ¶146.  
57 J.D. Power and Associates (2009).       25
                                                
Twelfth and Thirteenth CMRS Reports highlight some of the recent mobile data developments: 
music playing services, handsets equipped with GPS technology, streaming video services, 
Verizon’s Spring 2007 launch of V CAST Mobile TV, AT&T’s Spring 2007 launch of the Apple 
iPhone, and AT&T’s July 2008 launch of the 3G iPhone.  In the fall of 2008, Blackberry released 
its Blackberry Storm smartphone, and Sprint made available the Palm Pre with its new mobile 
operating system on Sprint’s network in June of 2009.
58  According to Greenstein’s (2009) 
framework for innovative health, continuing innovation and investment in the network along 
with competition between different standards is indicative of a healthy, competitive industry. 
5.  Conclusion on Downstream Wireless Markets 
The decreases in prices, increases in quantities consumed, improvements in quality, and 
ongoing technological innovation suggest a market, where, despite an increase in the HHI since 
2003, consumers have benefited tremendously from vigorous competition among wireless 
providers.  That said, the FCC and DOJ/FTC should carefully monitor further consolidation and 
changes in pricing to ensure that consumers continue to benefit from ongoing technological 
improvements.  
C.  Upstream Equipment and Applications Markets 
As discussed above in Section II, the ability and incentives of a wireless provider to 
restrict upstream suppliers anticompetitively depends not just on the competitiveness of the 
wireless market, but also on the extent of vertical integration by wireless providers into upstream 
markets for the provision of equipment (such as handsets) and applications, and the degree of 
competition in those upstream markets.  In this section we assess these issues.  We find that there 
is little integration by the wireless carriers into handsets and applications, and many independent 
competitors provide handsets and applications.  
1.  Equipment Markets 
The nationwide wireless providers do not manufacture their own wireless handsets; nor 
do they own equity in any major equipment manufacturers.  Instead, most of the handsets used 
 
58 Blackberry (2008); SprintNextel (2009).       26
                                                
by U.S. consumers are sold by large electronics firms that are not affiliated with U.S. wireless 
providers including the top selling brands (Motorola, Samsung, LG, Nokia, and Blackberry).
59  
Moreover, these top selling handset manufacturers provide handsets for all of the major U.S. 
wireless providers.
60  Consumers have considerable choice regarding handsets.  One recent study 
found that in early 2007, consumers had 154 unique handset options available directly from the 
four nationwide carriers plus Alltel, with an average of 34 handset choices per carrier, with 
additional handset models available from third-party sources.
61  Upstream suppliers of handsets 
sell in a global market and compete aggressively with each other for market share.  Although the 
nationwide US wireless providers are important customers for handset manufacturers, they also 
sell to many other wireless providers around the world.
62   U.S. wireless network operators may 
require handset manufacturers to make modifications prior to allowing usage on their systems.  
These modifications may be for network management or may serve other purposes.  Regardless, 
it does not change the competitiveness of the handset market, but can affect the features available 
on specific U.S. networks.  
2.  Applications Markets 
Most wireless providers control which applications are available and offer content 
through service provider branded and controlled portals.  In its 700 MHz Second Report and 
Order released in August 2007, the FCC, referring to its 2007 Wireless Broadband Classification 
Order, noted “in some cases, providers use filters to limit the web sites that a customer can 
access, and, in other cases, subscribers can enter any URL using a handset but the site may not 
be viewable due to software, processing, or other constraints of the device.”
63  However, 
different wireless carriers employ a variety of terms and conditions, and T-Mobile’s contracts in 
the U.S. have not contained such restrictions.  Moreover, none of the top Internet content sites, 
 
59 Based on U.S. market share in the first quarter of 2008. NPD Group Press Release, “The NPD Group: U.S. 
Consumer Mobile Phone Unit-Sales Declined 13 Percent Year-over-Year in Q2 2008,” August 19, 2008. 
60 Verified by information contained in manufacturer websites (LG, Motorola, Nokia, Research in Motion’s 
Blackberry, and Samsung). All manufacturers listed except for LG listed phones for all of the 4 major carriers. LG 
did not list a phone for T-Mobile.  Apple’s iPhone is currently limited to the AT&T network. 
61 Hahn, Litan and Singer (2007), p. 14.   
62 Even if there were vertical integration, that would not necessarily be bad for consumers.  Since there is no vertical 
integration, we do not address that issue in this analysis. 
63 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 15360, ¶198.       27
                                                
such as eBay, Google, Yahoo, Microsoft Networks, AOL, or Amazon, are affiliated with mobile 
wireless network providers.
64  
Recent developments suggest that wireless providers are responding to consumer 
demands for more “openness” to third-party content and applications without the need for 
regulatory mandate.  One example is the popular Apple iPhone.  When the iPhone was first 
introduced in July 2007, Apple did not use AT&T’s own web browsing and entertainment 
service to access the Internet, but kept significant control over applications and services.  Then in 
Fall 2007, Apple announced a software development kit allowing software developers to develop 
third-party applications for the iPhone.  Apple launched its AppStore, a platform for third party 
developers to market applications in July 2008.    
In late 2007, Verizon announced a new open access policy to provide consumers with 
access to its wireless network using “wireless devices, software, or applications not offered by 
the company” that meets certain technical standards.
65  During 2008, Verizon began 
implementing its open-access policy.
66  For example, Verizon now offers month-to-month 
agreements that allow consumers to use their own CDMA handsets without long-term service 
contracts.  In addition, Verizon acquired 7 of the 12 C Block open access licenses in the recent 
700 MHz auction, and has stated that it will use that additional spectrum for its “Open 
Development Initiative.”
67  It is unclear how these initiatives will play out as much will depend 
on interpretations of “reasonable network management.” 
Another “open access” initiative is Android, the mobile operating system developed by 
Google.  Android is a collaboration between Google, T-Mobile, HTC, Qualcomm, and Motorola.  
According to a Google press release:  
A broad alliance of leading technology and wireless companies today joined forces to 
announce the development of Android, the first truly open and comprehensive platform 
for mobile devices… By providing developers a new level of openness that enables them 
 
64 Based on unique visitors in January 2009. comScore Media Metrix Press Release, “comScore Media Metrix 
Ranks Top 50 U.S. Web Properties for January 2009,” February 19, 2009.  Google has an investment in Clearwire 
which may offer mobile wireless service in the future. 
65 Verizon Wireless (2007).  
66 Sharma (2008).  
67 Verizon Wireless (2008).       28
                                                
to work more collaboratively, Android will accelerate the pace at which new and 
compelling mobile services are made available to consumers.
68  
The first phones running Android, for use on T-Mobile’s network, were available to 
consumers in the second half of 2008.  The development of service offerings with varying 
degrees of “openness” suggests that “open access” is one important dimension in which carriers 
are competing for consumers.   
However, apparently Google restricted “tethering” applications on Android phones as 
part of its agreement with T-Mobile.
69  Tethering applications allow a subscriber to use a handset 
as a modem for a laptop computer.  Such uses tend to be more bandwidth intensive and are 
restricted by some providers.  However, providers have subscription plans for dedicated laptop 
cards (with some usage limits as discussed above), which would presumably have similarly 
intensive bandwidth demands.  Similarly, as discussed above, AT&T has barred the iPhone 
Skype application from working on its 3G network (but allows it to work over WiFi). 
3.  Conclusion on Upstream Markets 
There is little integration by wireless providers into equipment and applications, and 
many independent competitors provide equipment such as handsets and applications.  In the 
absence of vertical integration into applications or equipment – without an affiliated supplier in 
the adjacent market, a “monopoly provider” does not have an incentive to steer customers to its 
non-existent affiliate.  The situation at the time of Carterfone, when nearly all equipment used in 
the Bell System was supplied by Western Electric, is very different from the current situation.  
Wireless operators do not have an incentive to discriminate against equipment manufacturers, 
who are typically very large firms selling equipment into many international markets.  Similarly, 
wireless providers are not substantially vertically integrated into content and applications.  And 
while wireless providers have imposed limitations on applications, there are often legitimate 
network management justifications for doing so, and carriers appear to be responding to 
consumer demands for “openness.”   
 
68 Google (2007). 
69 Davies (2009).       29
D.  Per Se versus Rule of Reason 
Antitrust analysis counsels that there are limited circumstances to apply per se bars 
against behavior – when such behavior is so likely to be harmful to consumers and it is very 
unlikely that there could be any efficiency justification for the actions.  In addition to the lack of 
efficiency justifications, one of the pre-conditions for a per se bar is that a firm or group of firms 
have market power.   
Our analysis of the wireless industry shows that there are plausible efficiency 
justifications for many vertical restraints on equipment and application providers.  In addition, 
while still a highly concentrated industry, there is evidence of competition between the major 
wireless providers.  As a result, a per se bar on potentially pro-competitive behavior would not 
be in consumers’ interests.  However, there are alternative regulatory policies that could benefit 
consumers – increasing competition at the network level so there would be even less incentive to 
engage in exclusionary conduct that harms consumers.  
IV.  Increasing Consumer Welfare in Wireless 
A.  General Principles of Regulatory Intervention 
The goal of antitrust law in particular and competition policy in general is to increase 
overall welfare and generally relies on increasing competition as a tool.  Because of fixed costs, 
most unregulated markets are not like the perfectly competitive benchmark and virtually no 
regulated market approaches the perfectly competitive threshold.  In some cases, regulation can 
have perverse effects.  For example, regulation can distort economic decision making, reduce the 
incentive to innovate, and raise consumer prices.  As a result, there is a long-standing view in 
economics that regulations should pass a reasonable cost-benefit test – does a new regulation 
increase consumer welfare more than it reduces producer surplus?  Unfortunately, regulations 
generally cannot precisely target a specific imperfection in the market and cure that imperfection 
without having any other (possibly positive or negative) effects.   
For example, Hausman (2002) shows that rules designed to promote competition from 
wireless resellers led to substantially higher prices in those states than in states that did not enact 
such laws.  He claims that resellers pushed for higher prices because the regulation ensured       30
                                                
them a percentage markup so higher wholesale prices increased their profit margins.  In other 
states, the prices without the additional retail competition turned out to be lower, in part possibly 
because of the efficiencies of vertical integration that were denied by the resale mandates. 
Importantly, regulation is difficult in a dynamic industry like wireless, where innovation 
and investment are key to competition among incumbent firms and potential entrants.  
Preventing a firm from reaping the rewards of its investments and ingenuity or the threat of 
taking away such rewards can change a firm’s actions.  In fact, such worries help to motivate 
some of the proponents of network neutrality – they worry that the threat that network 
operator(s) will exclude innovators or expropriate their innovations will in turn cause a much 
lower level of innovative activity.  Innovation and investment incentives are important 
considerations and the same issues of incentives apply to network operators’ decisions to 
continue to invest in their networks to provide the services that consumers want. 
B.  The 700 MHz Openness Provisions  
In the 700 MHz spectrum auction that concluded in March, 2008, the FCC mandated that 
one band of the auctioned spectrum, the 700 MHz Upper Band C Block, have an open platform 
for devices and applications, subject to “reasonable network management.”
70  The Commission’s 
order was vague on the actual requirements for openness, and it was also vague about the 
meaning of “reasonable network management.” We expect those meanings to be the subject of 
contention as firm’s challenge Verizon’s implementation of the openness provisions on the C 
Block.  The ensuing policy debate about these openness provisions highlights some of the issues 
associated with Carterfone style regulation of wireless networks:  competition, complexity and 
regulatory uncertainty.     
As discussed above, vertical relationships are only likely to be a competitive problem 
when a firm possesses significant market power, and even then, only in certain circumstances.  
While wireless service is not a perfectly competitive market, the Commission’s annual CMRS 
Reports have consistently found that wireless service is competitively provided.  Despite having 
deemed wireless service provision to be competitive, the FCC nevertheless required “openness.”  
With competitive wireless networks, an openness requirement is likely to have little incremental 
impact on preventing anticompetitive activity.   However, the openness provision may entail cost 
 
70 700 MHz Second Report and Order, 22 FCC Rcd at 15360.       31
as firms may assert and defend this openness “right” at the FCC and in court.  In addition, 
openness in a competitive market can prevent efficient vertical relationships.  Given these costs 
with little apparent benefit in a competitive market, this openness provision may do little to 
improve consumer welfare.  
In addition, the vagueness of the openness requirements and network management 
exceptions make it difficult to believe that the enforcement will be satisfactory.  Proponents of 
openness are likely to say that the licensee has not gone far enough in opening its network and 
the network operator is likely to say it has gone further than necessary.  In addition, there are 
likely to be disputes about what “reasonable network management” for a wireless provider 
means.  It may well be different than “reasonable network management” for a wireline 
broadband operator.   
One potential benefit of the imposition of the openness requirements on the C block is the 
ability to use this “experiment” in openness to shed some light on the costs and benefits of such 
provisions on a more widespread scale and to clarify just what “openness” means.  If openness is 
problematic, the interactions between the C block licensee and upstream providers and 
downstream customers are likely to reflect such problems.  If openness provides large benefits 
and works smoothly, then other carriers, having to compete with an open access provider, may 
also adopt open platforms.  If openness is a severe competitive disadvantage, it is likely that 
there will be complaints against the provider if it unilaterally decides not to continue openness, 
or the provider may petition the FCC to relax the rules. 
In addition, by limiting the scope of the openness provisions to a single block of spectrum 
that it was auctioning for the first time, the Commission was able to avoid any concerns about 
“takings” due to a change in rule for existing licensees.  Instead, bidders knew upfront (to some 
extent) the rules on the spectrum they were buying.   
C.  Alternatives to Carterfone Style Regulation in Wireless 
Policy proposals for wireless networks should have as their primary focus increasing 
consumer welfare.  In general consumer welfare is enhanced by removing obstacles to 
competition by private firms, and not by favoring any one particular firm.  While there is already 
significant competition in the provision of wireless services, there are ways that wireless services 
can be even more competitive.  And more competitive wireless services have the added public       32
                                                
policy benefit of becoming a more competitive alternative to wireline voice and broadband data 
services.  
Since most concerns about vertical restraints arise from concentration at the local access 
level, the most important thing that the FCC should do is to stimulate competition at that level.  
Obviously, competition would be enhanced if it was economic for multiple firms to string fiber 
optic cable around all neighborhoods in the United States and there was enough spectrum 
available so that the auction price for spectrum was close to zero.  That is unlikely to happen.  
But the FCC has tools at its disposal to make facilities-based competition more likely and more 
viable even with these constraints.  In particular, the FCC can develop policies that facilitate new 
entry, investment in network infrastructure, and new service offerings both by incumbents and 
new entrants.  
1.  Increasing competition through spectrum policy 
First, the FCC should get even more spectrum out into the marketplace, using well 
designed auctions to encourage the most highly valued use of that spectrum.   
One quick way to get more spectrum into the market is to push government users to 
relocate from AWS spectrum more quickly.  Leap Wireless, MetroPCS and T-Mobile all bought 
spectrum in the AWS band in 2006, but cannot fully use it because the U.S. Government has not 
completely vacated the spectrum.
71 The FCC should do whatever it can inside the government to 
expedite this process and enable these competitors to use their AWS spectrum fully.   
Second, the FCC should re-auction the 10 MHZ of 700 MHz D block spectrum rapidly.
72  
Although the 10 MHz may not be enough spectrum to operate a full capacity system in dense 
urban areas, because of its technical characteristics, the D block can be used to provide the 
necessary “coverage” spectrum while AWS, PCS and other higher frequencies provide the 
“capacity” spectrum necessary in urban areas.  As a result, it may be a perfect complement to the 
 
71 For list of spectrum reallocation status as of December 2007 see U.S. Department of Commerce, 1710-1755 MHz 
Spectrum Band Relocation, First Annual Progress Report, March 2008,  
http://www.ntia.doc.gov/reports/2008/SpectrumRelocation2008.pdf 
Also http://wireless.fcc.gov/auctions/default.htm?job=auction_factsheet&id=66#Incumbents, last visited April 3, 
2009. 
72 In the 700 MHz auction, the FCC imposed onerous restrictions on the D block related to public safety combined 
with a high reserve price.  As a result, no firm was willing to meet the reserve price for that block of spectrum and 
the licenses were not sold in the auction.         33
                                                
spectrum held by competitors to Verizon and AT&T (who already have the bulk of the low 
frequency CMRS spectrum).  As a result, the D block spectrum can help to increase competition 
in wireless if it is auctioned rapidly. 
Third, the FCC should ensure that the “white spaces” are made available to the market in 
a reasonable way that allows them to provide competitive service to other low frequency 
spectrum.
73  While we think that licensing the spectrum and auctioning is the preferable method 
of doing this, if the Commission decides to make the spectrum available on license-free basis, it 
should do that without forcing the spectrum to remain fallow for a long period of time. 
An important consideration in auction design is the potentially different incentives of 
Verizon and AT&T compared to other providers.  After consolidation among wireline local 
exchange carriers, Verizon and AT&T are the largest incumbent landline telephone companies; 
they also hold licenses for valuable 850 MHz spectrum.  In the 700 MHz auction, Verizon and 
AT&T each bought large amounts of spectrum and, in many geographic areas, control more 
spectrum than the FCC’s threshold of 95 MHz.
74  While Verizon and AT&T are using that 
spectrum to build out their networks and develop better services, because they also own wireline 
networks in many areas they do not have the same competitive incentives that independent non-
wireline competitors have to compete with wireline voice and data services.  It will be important 
for the FCC to consider, using appropriate competition policy analysis in advance of the next 
spectrum auctions, whether to allow Verizon and AT&T to acquire more spectrum, or more low-
frequency spectrum.  Obviously, there are tradeoffs – Verizon and AT&T will have incentives to 
use additional spectrum and may introduce new services with additional spectrum.  At the same 
time, allowing other firms to acquire spectrum may enable competitive alternatives that lead to 
better wireless options for consumers. Any spectrum restriction should not be simply based on 
size, but on competitive analysis.  For example, a spectrum cap would have to take into account 
the fact that Sprint also has a large amount of spectrum, but limited spectrum below 1 GHz and a 
policy would have to assess the implications of the differences, if any, in spectrum at different 
frequencies. 
 
73 “White spaces” are frequencies allocated to broadcast television, but not licensed to a television station in a 
specific area and thus potentially available for other use. 
74 In its Verizon/Alltel merger Order (FCC, 2008) , the FCC reaffirmed  a screen for mergers that led to the merged 
firm controlling more than 95 MHz of spectrum capable of providing mobile service.        34
                                                
Finally, the FCC should consider all other mechanisms, such as the “Big Bang” (Kwerel 
and Williams, 2002) where all unallocated spectrum is combined with spectrum put up by 
private licensees in a single auction or some variant to rationalize spectrum rights to make them 
allocated to the public more efficiently.  As Kwerel and Williams discuss, the ability to auction 
large blocks of underutilized or inefficiently utilized spectrum rights in a single marketplace can 
substantially reduce aggregation risks for spectrum buyers and also ensure that sellers realize the 
value of their spectrum. 
2.  Allowing operating flexibility 
With the potential for additional competition, one would not want to institute rules that 
would frustrate new competitors and new investments.  If vertical integration was an important 
competitive strategy, new entrants might be frustrated from entering if they could not vertically 
integrate.  For example, some new wireless entrants have usage restrictions to manage their 
networks and make entry more attractive.  For example, XOHM, the Sprint WiMax service 
which has been combined with Clearwire, and Lariat Networks, a wireless internet access 
provider, impose acceptable use and network management policies on their users.  Among other 
restrictions, XOHM may restrict downloading specs and transfer rates or limit the number of 
sessions or applications of protocols to manage its network most efficiently for all users.
75   
Owen and Rosston (2006) discuss how policy can affect the entry incentives of new 
entrants and investment incentives of incumbents.  Although the Owen and Rosston analysis 
focuses on wireline broadband access, similar incentive issues arise in the wireless context.  For 
any investment to take place, firms have to believe they will be better off from having made the 
investment than not.  If policy reduces the returns to investment, at the margin, firms are less 
likely to invest.  For new entrants, more onerous regulation can affect the scale and scope of 
entry, or make entry unviable.  Similarly, uncertainty over future regulation may reduce the 
incentives for new entrants to innovate and invest.  
Finally, operating flexibility should also be reflected in rules and regulations that help to 
promote an active secondary market for spectrum and spectrum services (Mayo and Wallsten, 
2009).  While initial allocations may be optimal at the time of the allocation, both demand and 
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technology will change, leading to different valuations for spectrum in providing different 
services. 
3.  Increasing competition through universal service policy 
The current universal service program is also a barrier to competition and is so inefficient 
that it should be scrapped.
76  Instituting a low-cost, efficient and competitively neutral universal 
service program would be much better for promoting competition between wireless providers, 
and between wireless and wireline providers.  The most anticompetitive aspect of the current 
universal service program is the proposal to pay incumbent telephone providers more than new 
competitors for providing the same services.  The incumbents are right that new entrants should 
not be paid the same high rates that incumbents get – instead, all providers, including the 
incumbents, should be paid the minimum amount necessary for the most efficient provider to 
provide service.  But incumbents have been able to use the regulatory process to forestall 
competition.   
Without these artificial barriers, more wireless providers with low costs would have an 
incentive to build out networks in rural areas (and in urban areas because their tax rates for USF 
would be lower).  The more network build out by additional competitors, the stronger 
competition will be.  Getting rid of the pro-incumbent bias in the universal service program 
would help competition and diminish the need for ex ante regulation of vertical relationships. 
4.  Antitrust Enforcement 
As described above in Section II, vertical restrictions can be on balance procompetitive or 
anticompetitive, depending on the particular circumstances.  Regulation that is preemptive and 
overly broad will prevent pro-competitive vertical arrangements alongside anti-competitive 
anticompetitive ones.  Ex post situation-specific antitrust enforcement is better able to target just 
the anticompetitive relationships.  Thus, the antitrust authorities and the FCC should continue to 
 
76For more background on the universal service program see Riordan (2002).  For a set of guideposts for future 
universal service policy, see Mayo (forthcoming).       36
                                                
be vigilant in investigating specific practices that may on balance be found to be 
anticompetitive.
77  
However, antitrust enforcement introduces new potential costs.  A targeted antitrust 
investigation is likely to require detailed and expensive investigation, is time consuming, and 
may not be completed until long after the alleged anticompetitive restrictions were put in place.  
 
V. Conclusion 
It is important for policymakers to think about the possible outcomes, intended or 
otherwise, of any network neutrality regulation.  The competition policy analysis in this article 
has been focused on the wireless marketplace, but the framework is applicable to other network 
settings as well.   
Policymakers have two broad choices – institute prophylactic network neutrality rules or 
forebear from such rules and rely on situation specific analysis and enforcement.  (Obviously, 
there are a number of different intermediate options available as well, and the details are likely to 
matter.)  In antitrust terms, this is the difference between a per se rule prohibiting certain actions 
and a “rule of reason” approach. 
If policymakers adopt network neutrality rules and such regulation is effective, it will be 
more difficult for network operators to charge different prices for similar uses of bandwidth.  If 
network operators try to raise price for some services, third-party providers will be able to enter 
and provide the same services at a lower price.  For example, when AT&T was the dominant 
provider of long-distance telephone services, a set of court decisions allowed resellers to buy 
packages of services and resell them to end users, reducing substantially AT&T’s ability to 
charge higher prices to customers with more inelastic demand. 
As a result of wireless network neutrality rules, pricing for network services would likely 
move toward pricing for a single product – bandwidth.  There may be differential pricing with 
some volume discounts, and possibly some form of congestion pricing, but essentially the 
network operators will move toward single product providers.  If there are no big benefits from 
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vertical integration or the ability to engage in Ramsey pricing, then this would lead to an 
efficient form of segregation of the network provision from content and application provision.   
If competition between network operators would ultimately lead to a breakdown of price 
discrimination, network neutrality rules will have little effect.  But in the wireless market with its 
significant fixed costs and network investment, some services will have prices above short-run 
marginal cost to pay for the network, even with vigorous competition between network 
operators.  To cover network costs efficiently in such a market setting, it is likely there will be 
price discrimination, but such discrimination is not necessarily a measure or indicator of 
consumer harm.  On the other hand, if network neutrality regulation forces firms to a solution 
that would not arise from market forces, then it will shift returns away from the network 
operators and possibly cause a reduction in network investment.   
If policy makers do not force network neutrality, there are several possibilities: 
competition might force firms closer to non-discriminatory pricing schemes; competition might 
lead to pricing of services with some discrimination that is pro-competitive (see the rationales 
discussed above for procompetitive vertical restraints); firms might choose a neutral pricing 
scheme even without competitive pressure; or firms might discriminate in an anticompetitive 
manner that harms wireless consumers.  
The policy question for a regulatory agency is whether it thinks that competition will not 
be sufficient to force firms into efficient behavior.  If regulators intervene, they risk reducing the 
incentive for firms to invest in their networks and can prevent efficiency enhancing investment 
both upstream and downstream.  On the other hand, if they do not intervene, they risk a firm 
frustrating consumers and entrepreneurs who would otherwise invest to complement the network 
and compete with services of the network. 
Regulators should consider the competitive nature of the market and the potential 
procompetitive aspects of vertical restrictions before making blanket decisions – a rule of reason 
approach is more appropriate when actions can have both procompetitive and anticompetitive 
results.  Some behaviors are viewed as problematic in a concentrated market when a firm is 
dominant, but procompetitive and to the benefit of consumers when there is sufficient 
competition.  Moreover, regulators should account for the challenges of adopting effective 
regulation, especially in an industry with rapid innovation and the potential adverse 
consequences of regulation.        38
The competition analysis in this article shows that the wireless market is not “perfectly 
competitive,” but that despite significant fixed costs wireless is a market with significant 
competition among network operators.  As in any market, it would be better to have more 
competition.  However, there are better policy tools for increasing wireless competition than ex 
ante Carterfone-style regulation of wireless providers.  Increasing the amount of spectrum, 
providing operational flexibility to network operators, speeding the relocation of government 
users, vigorous antitrust enforcement (including the prevention of excessive aggregation of 
wireless spectrum) and revamping universal service to be competitively neutral all have the 
effect of harnessing market forces, and give consumers, rather than regulators or specific firms, a 
big vote in the future development of wireless voice and data services.      39
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Percentage of Population with Access to Wireless Services by Number of 
Providers
2000 – 2008
Source:  12th FCC CMRS Report; 13th FCC CMRS Report
Number of CMRS 
Providers in a County 7/2000 7/2001 7/2002 7/2003 7/2004 7/2005 7/2006 7/2007 7/2008
1
3 or More 87.8% 90.8% 94.1% 94.7% 96.8% 96.9% 98.0% 98.0% 95.5%
4 or More 79.8% 84.4% 88.7% 89.3% 93.0% 93.2% 93.8% 93.6% 90.5%
5 or More
2 68.5% 75.1% 80.4% 82.6% 87.5% 87.3% 50.8% 59.1% 64.9%
Notes: 
[1]  For 7/2008, data at the census block level is used because data at the county level is not available. Thus, the data from 2008 may not be 
directly comparable to previous years' data.
[2] The the percentage of the population living in counties with 5 or more providers fell in 2006, primarily because of the mergers between 
Sprint and Nextel, and Alltel and Western Wireless Corporation. 
DRAFT:  5/15/09Table 2
Wireless Service Revenue
1993 – 2007
















1993 $61.49 140 $0.44 $0.44
1994 $56.21 119 $0.47 $0.47
1995 $51.00 119 $0.43 $0.43
1996 $47.70 125 $0.38 $0.38
1997 $42.78 117 $0.37 $0.37
1998 $39.43 136 $0.29 $0.29
1999 $41.24 185 $0.22 $0.22
2000 $45.27 255 $0.18 $0.18
2001 $47.37 380 $0.12 $0.12
2002 $48.40 427 $0.11 $0.11
2003 $49.91 507 $0.10 $0.10
2004 $50.64 584 $0.09 $0.08
2005 $49.98 708 $0.07 $0.06
2006 $50.56 714 $0.07 $0.06
2007 $49.79 769 $0.06 $0.05
Notes:
[1]  The 13th FCC CMRS Report used "Avergage Local Monthly Bill" for the measure of 
ARPU.
[2]  Average minutes of use per subscriber per month (MOUs).
DRAFT:  5/15/09Table 3
Wireless Subscribers, Minutes of Use, and Penetration
2001 – 2007























2001 128.5 119.9 380 45%
2002 141.8 131.8 427 49%
2003 160.6 152.7 507 54% 3.5%
2004 184.7 173.8 584 62% 5.4%
2005 213.0 200.5 708 71% 7.7%
2006 241.8 225.9 714 80% 11.8%
2007 263.0 245.8 769 86% 14.5%
Notes:
[1]  Year end data from 13th CMRS Report.
[2]  Year end data from CTIA's Wireless Industry Indices Midyear 2008.
[3]  Average minutes of use per subscriber per month (MOUs).
[4]  Estimated from NRUF (FCC's Numbering Resources Utilization/Forecast).
[5]  Percent of adults living in household with only wireless phones.  Data from Stephen J. Blumberg,
[4]  Ph.D., and Julian V. Luke, Wireless Substitution: Early Release of Estimates From The Data  from
[4]  the National Health Interview Survey, July – December 2007, National Center for Health Statistics,
[4]  Centers for Disease Control.  Data is not available prior to 2003.
DRAFT:  5/15/09Table 4
Reported Six-Month SMS and MMS Traffic 
Volume
2004 – 2008







Jun 2005 32.54 0.28
Dec 2005 48.66 0.85
Jun 2006 64.82 1.14
Dec 2006 93.83 1.59
Jun 2007 146.99 2.61
Dec 2007 215.56 3.49
Jun 2008 384.97 5.63
Notes:  Figures are for the 6 months ending in the period 
given.
















Average Revenue per Minute and Average Revenue per Voice Minute
1993 – 2007
Source:  Table 12 of 13th FCC CMRS Report Average 
Revenu
e